In a recent paper in JVI, ‘An Anarchist Interpretation of Marx’s “Ability to Needs” Principle,’ Spafford has argued that: (i) the communist and anarchist traditions share an objection to a particular kind of exchange (which he calls quid pro quo exchange); (ii) the anarchist objection to quid pro quo exchange can be understood as opposition to conditional exchange; (iii) consequently, the objection motivates an opposition to conditional exchange as such (i.e. a commitment to unconditional exchange); and (iv) we can construct (...) a normative justification of this opposition by reference to the value of freedom, given that conditional exchange offers diminish the freedom of the recipients of the offers. In this reply piece I argue that (ii) is importantly mistaken, and that consequently (iii) also fails. Although all quid pro quo exchanges are conditional exchanges, the converse does not hold, and we have reason to believe that there will be instances of conditional exchange that are unobjectionable by the lights of the traditional anarchist and communist objection to such exchange. Consequently, an opposition to all conditional exchange rules out too much. However, I will argue that a suitably modified version of (iv) may nevertheless survive the counterexamples that defeat (ii). (shrink)

According to the Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, conscious states are just those states that are the object of a suitable higher-order thought to the effect that one is in that state. These higher-order thoughts perform this role by providing subjects with a particular type of _awareness_. However, HOT theorists have tended to offer two alternative formulations of this awareness when stating the basic claims of HOT theory. According to what I call the _state formulation_ of HOT theory, HOTs (...) provide subjects with an awareness of _mental states_, and a mental state is conscious only if the subject is aware of that state. According to what I call the _oneself formulation_ of HOT theory, HOTs provide subjects with an awareness of _themselves as being in a mental state_, and a mental state is conscious only if the subject is aware of themselves as being in that state. In this paper I explore the dialectical significance and legitimacy of HOT theorists’ current practice of employing both formulations. I argue that there is some reason for HOT theorists to adopt the oneself formulation, rather than the state formulation. However, this appears to weaken HOT theory considerably, by abandoning the idea that when our mental states are conscious, we are aware of those states themselves. Against this objection I argue that adopting the oneself formulation does not require abandoning the basic idea lying behind the state formulation and that this is consistent with the reasons for favouring the oneself formulation. (shrink)